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Abstract
 East Timor is widely regarded as a success story for UN peacekeeping efforts, and 
indeed is promoted as such by the organization itself.2 There are two sources of controversy, 
however, linked to assessment of the East Timor case. First, the UN involvement in East 
Timor went far beyond traditional peacekeeping, and, as such, the organization （and its 
members which took part） may have exceeded the scope of its legal competence. The 
approach in East Timor was, in practice, a state-building exercise, in which the UN fully 
assumed the nation’s sovereignty in order to provide the foundations of good governance – 
reconciling conflicting interests （peace and security） and generating collective good 
（development）. Here, therefore, the UN missions may be entering into the realm of 
legitimacy （moral justifications for action） rather than strict legality. This leads to the 
second, potentially larger area of controversy. If a UN mission is to be seen as legitimate 
under the UN’s own terms of assessment, it must lay the foundations of long-term peace 
and development, i.e. human security. Despite the claims of the UN, it is debatable 
whether this has fully been achieved in the case of East Timor. This paper then, will assess 
the legality and legitimacy of UN peacekeeping missions in East Timor from a critical 
perspective.
Key words: United Nations, Peacekeeping Operations, East Timor, Legality, Legitimacy, 
Security Sector Reform
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Ⅰ．Introduction
 On Monday, December 31, 2012, the United Nations （UN） brought 
officially to an end its series of peacekeeping missions/administrations in East 
Timor, dating back to in July 1999, when the United Nations Missions in 
East Timor （UNAMET） was established by the Security Council Resolution 
1246 in order to organize the popular consultation on independence. The 
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UN Transitional Administration in East Timor （UNTAET）, which had a 
peacekeeping operation （PKO） mandate, ran from 1999 until 2002, with 
the aim of administering the territory, exercising legislative and executive 
authority during the transition period until independence, and supporting 
capacity-building for self-government.3 At the end of this period, with East 
Timor celebrating the recovery of its independence not only from Indonesia, 
but also from the UN administration which followed, the UN felt able to laud 
its own achievements:
  Widely regarded as a success story for the United Nations peacekeeping 
efforts, East Timor will officially become its own nation led by 
President-elect Xanana Gusmão on May 20, 2002. This comes almost 
three years after the August 1999 elections that resulted in 98 percent4 
of East Timorese voters choosing independence from Indonesia. In 
response to the bloody civil strife that followed the vote, the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor （UNTAET） was 
established to provide an integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping 
operation fully responsible for the administration of East Timor during 
its transition to independence.5
 Indeed, the UN had played a vital role in East Timor’s independence by 
organizing the 1999 popular consultation, which ended Indonesia’s 24-year 
occupation. For Markus Benzing, the East Timor case study is particularly 
noteworthy as it is “the most radical ‘state-building’ exercise the United 
Nations has engaged in to date, in the most literal sense of the word, as the 
United Nations acted as midwife for a new state”.6 Optimistic assessments 
of the long-term future stability of East Timor upon independence proved, 
however, to be premature. The timing of Benzing’s publication was 
particularly unfortunate as UN peacekeeping troops had to return in 2006 in 
the guise of the Australian-led International Stabilisation Force （ISF） after 
fighting between sections of East Timorese police and military forces set up 
by the UN administration, led to social and political instability. President 
José Ramos-Horta was critically injured in an armed attack on February 11, 
2008, and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão was also allegedly to have been 
attacked, again leading to the Australian government immediately sending 
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reinforcements to East Timor to keep order in response to a request from the 
government of East Timor.7 This was despite the fact that, according to the 
Supplemental Arrangement exchanged between the UN and the government 
of East Timor, it was the responsibility of a UN peacekeeping mission — 
the United Nations Integrated Missions in Timor-Leste （UNMIT） — to 
provide law and order in East Timor, and thus decide such actions.8
 UN operations in East Timor in fact, out of necessity, went far beyond 
peacekeeping. At the very least, they amounted to peacebuilding, or even 
peace enforcement, although the peace enforcement function was carried out 
by UN-mandated multinational military operations such as the International 
Force East Timor （INTERFET） and ISF. According to Hideaki Asahi, in 
the East Timorese context, “peace-building is tantamount to state-building”, 
with reference to top-down, state-centric processes with a structural focus 
on putting in place the central- and national-level institutions of the state.9 
Viewed from the perspective of a modern state model, it seemed that East 
Timor lacked experience of self-rule, effective central government institutions, 
and laws, regulations, and other normative codes of control to bind or unite 
local communities and citizens, despite the fact that an indigenous system 
of community governance and justice did exist in the territory. For example, 
an administrative ward such as Aldeia and Suco has served as basic units of 
local governance, Lia Nain, an indigenous ritual mediator, served in conflict 
resolution and justice mechanisms such as nahe bite boot10 and tara bandu.11 
The UN was blind to existing local structures and mechanisms, which were 
alien to the typical western model of state-building. Thus, the first task of the 
international community was seen as being to foster the growth of indigenous 
“national” governance structures, which could serve as an overarching 
framework of state apparatus.
 Accordingly, therefore, Kamalesh Sharma, Special Representative of 
the Secretary General （SRSG） of the United Nations Mission of Support 
in East Timor （UNMISET）, the successor UN mission which began life on 
20 May, 2002, the same day as East Timorese （restoration of） independence, 
immediately identified the need to “Start from Scratch”,12 overlooking the 
vital need to build on indigenous foundations. This inability of the UN to 
identify and work with local mechanisms and customs has undermined the 
legitimacy of the UN in the eyes of the local population. 
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 Regardless of the necessity of such far-reaching usurpation of 
sovereignty and imposition of governance structures （at least at the level of 
national government）, it is questionable whether the UN and members of the 
international community acting under the auspices of the UN, were legally 
empowered to carry them out, although one can argue that the authorization 
by the UN Security Council （SC） would be sufficient to undertake even such 
a broad usurpation of sovereignty. But perhaps an even larger question mark 
hangs over their efficacy. Despite claims to the contrary, the evidence of the 
2006 upheavals suggested that initial state-building operations carried out 
under first UNTAET and then UNMISET were a failure （although the 2007 
elections were mostly peaceful, they were extremely divisive）. Despite the 
peaceful 2012 elections, and the withdrawal of the overwhelming majority of 
external mission personnel, the underlying foundations for long-term peace, 
stability, and development, may yet to have been fully laid. Toward the end 
of its term, faced with growing frustration of the East Timorese leadership, 
and their sense of national pride against the usurpation of sovereignty and 
imposition of governance structures, UNMIT’s legitimacy in the eyes of host 
population became eroded, further undermining its efficacy.
 Under the UN’s own terms of assessment, therefore, operations in East 
Timor may have fallen short of the standards required for legitimacy as well 
as those for strict legality. In an official document called “the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines”, the UN recognizes 
legitimacy as one of the measurements of success and divides the concept into 
two — international legitimacy and perceived legitimacy on the ground.13 
The manner through which the UN peacekeeping operations engaged in 
state-building endeavors in East Timor can therefore be criticized for having 
fallen short of the UN standards, namely: “the respect it （UN peacekeeping 
operation） shows to local customs, institutions and laws, and the decency with 
which it treats the local people all have a direct effect upon perceptions of its 
legitimacy”.14
 This paper first critically assesses the legality of the UN peacekeeping 
missions in East Timor. It then turns to address the more nebulous, but 
perhaps more important questions of legitimacy of UN operations and their 
cessation. There are major areas of concern when it comes to normative 
justifications for UN peacekeeping missions in East Timor related to human 
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security challenges such as Security Sector Reform （SSR）, national/local 
ownership, unequal development and distribution of resources （especially with 
regard to youth, women, and rural communities）, and the self-sustainability of 
governance structures.
Ⅱ．The Legality of UN Operations in East Timor
 The United Nations had concerned itself with the East Timor 
question long before there was an independent state of that name, or even 
the possibility of such a state coming into being. In 1960, while the territory 
was still under Portuguese administration, the UN General Assembly 
（UNGA） ruled that “East Timor and Dependencies were a non-self-
governing territory according to Chapter IX of the UN Charter, and to 
which the General Assembly Resolution on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples applied”.15 From 1975, after the Portuguese 
withdrawal from East Timor, which was followed by a tripartite civil war 
amongst East Timorese factions and the violent annexation of the territory 
by Indonesia, both the UNGA and the UNSC repeatedly condemned the 
Indonesian occupation and called for Indonesian forces to pull out. Crucially, 
however, the Indonesian actions were not condemned as an act of aggression 
（which would justify UNSC-authorized military action by others to reverse 
the act of aggression）, nor were they identified as a breach of Article 2 （4） of 
the Charter requiring states to refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state.16 Such a lukewarm reaction of the international community was 
the result of US policy in the Cold War era, in which Indonesia was seen as 
a seawall against the expansion of communism in South East Asia. Hence, 
it was not until a change in the international operating environment with 
the end of the Cold War, more norm-driven and interventionary foreign 
policy agendas among great powers, and the reinvigoration of international 
organizations, when combined with internal political changes in Indonesia, 
that progress on the East Timor question became possible.
 In 1998, the authoritarian regime of Major General Suharto, who had 
effectively ruled Indonesia since a military coup in 1965, finally came to an 
end. That June, the new President, Habibie, proposed a special status for East 
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Timor which stopped short of full independence, but provided stimulus for 
further talks between the conflictual parties. In particular, negotiations at the 
UN between the two colonial powers, Indonesia and Portugal, ultimately 
led, on May 5, 1999, to the “Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of East Timor”.17 The 
two parties, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal, agreed that the 
Secretary-General of the UN should consult the East Timorese people on the 
constitutional framework for autonomy which was attached to the Agreement 
as an annex, through a direct, secret and universal ballot. The key points of the 
agreement were that:
・Article 1, the Secretary-General was to put the proposed constitutional 
framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the 
unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, for their 
consideration and acceptance or rejection.
・Article 2, that an appropriate United Nations mission in East Timor be 
established to enable the popular consultation to take place.
・Article 3, that the Government of Indonesia would be responsible for 
maintaining peace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the 
popular consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way.
・Article 4, that the UNSC, UNGA, the Governments of Indonesia and 
Portugal, and the East Timorese people be informed of the result.
・Article 5, if the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy 
was acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia 
would initiate the necessary constitutional measures, while East Timor 
would be removed from Portugal’s agenda and those of the UNGA and 
UNSC.
・Article 6, if not acceptable to the East Timorese people, “the Government 
of Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps necessary to terminate its 
links with East Timor thus restoring under Indonesian law the status East 
Timor held prior to 17 July 1976, and the Governments of Indonesia 
and Portugal and the Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements for 
a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United 
Nations. The Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative 
mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a process of 
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transition towards independence.”
・Article 7, “During the interim period between the conclusion of the 
popular consultation and the start of the implementation of either option, 
the parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United 
Nations presence in East Timor”.18
 At first sight, therefore, it seems that UN operations rest on fairly firm 
legal foundations. The UN was asked to become involved by the interested 
parties, Indonesia and Portugal （as East Timor at that time was not a 
constituted state, the UN was not required, in fact was not able to consult 
national authorities）. Not only that, but the UN’s initial involvement was 
specifically to include consultation with the people of East Timor. The 
Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic 
on the Question of East Timor also included clauses outlining the UN’s role 
post the consultation exercise. Indeed, the UN was obligated to maintain an 
adequate presence in East Timor until such time as full independence became 
a viable option. With the overwhelming rejection of the special autonomy 
proposal, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal, and the Secretary-
General, were therefore committed to making arrangements for a peaceful 
and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the UN, and, ultimately, to 
enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.
 UN involvement in East Timor was also legalized by relevant UNSC 
Resolutions. First, in July 1999, the Security Council passed Resolution 
1246 which established the UNAMET in order to organize the popular 
consultation. Following the overwhelming vote in favor of independence, 
and the breakdown of law and order, with rampaging pro-Indonesian militia 
killing pro-Independence local civilians, driving many from their homes, 
and forcing the evacuation of many UNAMET personnel, the UNSC again 
met to endorse UN action in East Timor.19 Resolution 1264 determined the 
situation to be a threat to international peace and security, thereby justifying 
Chapter VII enforcement actions in the form of a multinational military 
intervention （the UN-mandated, Australian-led INTERFET） followed 
by a peacekeeping mission （UNTAET）.20 According to UNSC Resolution 
1272 of October 25, 1999, UNTAET’s mandate consisted of the following 
elements:
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・To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of 
East Timor;
・To establish an effective administration;
・To assist in the development of civil and social services;
・To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
rehabilitation and development assistance;
・To support capacity-building for self-government;
・To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.21
 Likewise, with independence, and on the same day, UNMISET 
was established by UNSC Resolution 1410 of May 17, 2002 to succeed 
UNTAET, and to provide assistance to core administrative structures critical 
to the viability and political stability of East Timor.22 Thus at each stage, the 
involvement of the UN in East Timor was sanctioned through the explicit 
endorsement of UNSC Resolutions, the highest source of relevant positive 
international law.
 Questions remain as to the legality of UN PKOs in general, given 
that they are not explicitly authorized, or indeed even mentioned in the UN 
Charter, falling somewhere in between Chapter VI concerning peaceful 
settlement of disputes and Chapter VII enforcement actions. Article 24 （1） 
of the Charter, however, notes that “In order to ensure prompt and effective 
action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security 
Council acts on their behalf”. PKOs, therefore, can be seen as falling within 
the Security Council’s remit, and UNSC Resolutions as bestowing legality 
on such operations. There remains a further question as to the extent to 
which states must give their explicit consent to be bound by international 
law, and whether PKOs can only legally be instigated with the consent of 
the host state, when for much of the early period of UN operations in East 
Timor there was no national authority to give such consent. But here the UN 
did the best they could, receiving explicit endorsement from the two former 
national authorities, Portugal and Indonesia, and also consulting the general 
population of East Timor directly, although failing to incorporate the views of 
East Timorese resistance organizations such as the CNRT （Conselho Nacional 
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da Resistência Timorense or National Congress for Timorese Resistance） 
and FRETILIN （Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente or 
Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor）.
 The biggest legal challenge, however, is that UN missions in East Timor 
actually went beyond the traditional mandate of PKOs which could be legally 
endorsed by the process outlined above. Since the end of the Cold War, under 
the new aspiration for the role of the UN in peacekeeping, peacebuilding 
and even peace enforcement, UN peacekeeping operations were deployed in 
internal conflicts such as in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Angola, 
and given a mandate of state-building with the usurpation of sovereignty and 
imposition of foreign （in the sense of not indigenous） governance structures 
without serious and rigorous legal scrutiny.23 Transitional administration and 
state-building endeavors have been assigned to UN peacekeeping operations 
as if they were the equivalent of tasks given to the UN by the mandate of the 
UN Trusteeship Council in the decolonization process.
 UN PKOs had traditionally been viewed as forces placed between 
parties to a conflict with the aim of preventing future break-downs of peace 
and security, and for monitoring cease-fire agreements. UN missions in East 
Timor, from the very first, went beyond this very limited scope of competence 
and operations. East Timor, in fact, was a manifestation of post-Cold War 
comprehensive or robust peacekeeping within which the UN was envisaged 
as playing a greatly expanded role. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali had outlined these expanded expectations in his 1992 post-Cold War 
“An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-
keeping” which even in the title hinted at a controversial commitment to 
a much greater role, and went into more details in the main body of the 
work.24 In this document Boutros-Ghali examined preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking and peace-keeping, to which he added “a closely related 
concept, post-conflict peacebuilding”.25 This “wider mission” required greater 
involvement and commitment from the UN and its Members, and Boutros-
Ghali noted that peace-keeping had only “hitherto” required the consent of 
all parties, implying that this was no longer the case.26 Such a view towards 
new requirements of peacekeeping was diminished after the critical failure of 
UN peacekeeping in Somalia and former Yugoslavia, which forced Boutros-
Ghali to issue a “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” in 1995, reiterating the 
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importance of the consent of the parties.27
 Despite the serious set-backs of early 1990s, UN involvement in East 
Timor certainly seemed to reflect a new interpretation of peacekeeping, not 
only due to the lack of consent from all parties involved, but also due to the 
dramatically expanded roles undertaken by UN missions. The “Agreement” 
between Indonesia and Portugal included “arrangements for a peaceful 
and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations”. 
In organizing the “Popular Consultation”, UNAMET was undertaking 
tasks which went beyond a peacekeeping remit. UNTAET was set up with 
an explicit PKO mandate, and took over internal security operations from 
INTERFET, but its role also went well beyond traditional PKO. Indeed, 
as outlined above, its role included extensive governance and state-building 
activities. Finally, UNMISET’s role was to be explicitly focused on long-
term development, administrative, and governance structures. In other 
words, UN peacekeeping missions in East Timor had travelled a fair distance 
from the original PKO concepts of keeping conflictual parties apart and 
monitoring cease-fires. Moreover, they were not equipped with sufficient/
adequate experience, capacity, resources and strategies to carry out massive 
state-building mandates. This point is particularly acute when we shift our 
analysis to the legitimacy of the UN missions in the next section, as perceived 
legitimacy on the ground is linked to the ability of the mission to meet with 
the expectation of the people in the host country.
 The process of linking security and development in policy-making in 
order to secure a more durable peace has become known as Security Sector 
Reform （SSR）. According to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, SSR “is 
a core element of multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding, essential 
for addressing the roots of conflict and building the foundations of long-term 
peace and development”.28 Absent explicit legal endorsement of this mission 
growth, however, it may be necessary to examine UN peacekeeping missions 
in East Timor through the wider lens of legitimacy – i.e. to what extent the 
broadening of UN responsibility was normatively justifiable through the need 
to do the right thing, but also the extent to which UN operations did then 
do the “right thing” in terms of the missions own criteria and objectives, and 
laying the foundations of long-term peace and development. The following 
sections analyze the performance of UN peacekeeping missions in East Timor 
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from these normative perspectives.
Ⅲ．The Legitimacy of UN Operations in East Timor
 The UN’s own criteria for the mission’s legitimacy are twofold: 
international legitimacy and domestic legitimacy, or perceived legitimacy on 
the ground.29 International legitimacy can be interpreted as the willingness 
of the Member States of the UN continuously to support the mission （in 
both financial and normative terms）, as well as to provide legal foundations 
for the operation in the form of a mandate or UNSC Resolutions. As such 
it is broader in nature than the strict legal positivism of treaties, UNSC 
Resolutions, and findings of the International Court of Justice, implying 
that we must also consult subsidiary sources of international law such as 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”; the 
“general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”; and “judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations”.30 Perceived legitimacy on the ground can be understood as a 
result of an even more complex and subjective process. In this section, we shall 
address two components of perceived legitimacy on the ground: credibility 
（capacity to carry out the given mandate） and commission （permission 
given to undertake some of the responsibility of sovereignty）. A third 
domestic normative category which may be termed legacy, or achievement 
in laying the foundations for long-term peace and development, will be 
extensively addressed in the final analytical section of this paper.
（1）Pre-2006 Crisis
 Among the key processes listed above in UNTAET’s mandate, 
indigenous capacity-building, particularly capacity related to peace and 
security, features strongly. The UNSC characterized the continuing situation 
in East Timor as “a threat to international peace and security”, invoking 
Chapter VII and authorized UNTAET to “take all necessary measures” 
to fulfill its mandate, and charging its military component with, inter alia, 
providing security and maintaining law and order in the territory, ensuring 
delivery of humanitarian assistance, providing security for UN personnel and 
property, and disarming and demobilizing armed groups.31 UN missions in 
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East Timor were regarded by some “as successful examples of externally-led 
security sector transformation in so far as they managed to establish a local 
police force and local security governance institutions”.32 Indeed, as pointed 
out by Ludovic Hood, “over 100,000 refugees and internally displaced persons 
（IDPs） were resettled, a civil administration was built from scratch, free and 
fair elections were held, and an independent nation emerged from centuries of 
Portuguese colonial rule, 24 years of Indonesian military occupation, and the 
devastating violence of 1999”.33
 Ultimately, however, the security sector infrastructure established by the 
UN administration under UNTAET, and clashes between the disparate forces 
delineated by UN policies at this time contributed to the collapse of the initial 
period of rule of law. As summarized by International Crisis Group （ICG）, 
“four years after Timor-Leste gained independence, its police and army were 
fighting each other in the streets of Dili. The April-June 2006 crisis left both 
institutions in ruins and security again in the hands of international forces”.34 
ICG traces the roots of the 2006 violence to decisions taken on the security 
sector in the years before and after independence in 2002.35 Upon Indonesian 
withdrawal, the only major functioning security forces on the ground in East 
Timor were associated with the independence struggle, most prominently 
FALINTIL （the Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste or 
the Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor）, which stayed 
in cantonment at Aileu in the run-up to the popular consultation, and for 
another seventeen months afterwards, while the UN wondered what to do 
with it.36
 The unwillingness, or inability of the UN to train the former guerillas 
and integrate them into the new security sector was reflected by the fact 
that FALINTIL was not mentioned in UNSC Resolution 1272, but 
was, rather, “perceived as a problematic residue of the twenty-four year 
struggle for independence; a view which neglected the popular support 
and legitimacy FALINTIL enjoyed, at least in the eastern provinces”.37 
Initially, Xanana Gusmão, commander-in-chief of FALINTIL even stated 
on various occasions that East Timor would not possess armed forces upon 
independence.38 Gusmão’s pacifist philosophy soon shifted however, when, 
in November 1999, the UN failed to give proper treatment to FALINTIL 
fighters who were voluntarily in cantonment in Aileu. The UN administration 
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missed the opportunity to disband FALINTIL, and at the same time stored 
up resentment in their ranks while focusing on developing the police forces. 
 According to UNTAET regulation 2001/22, which in turn was based 
on UNSC Resolution 1272, the East Timor Police Service （ETPS） came 
into being in August 2001 （later known as the PNTL, Policia Nacional de 
Timor-Leste or National Police of East Timor）, but training and selection 
processes for police recruits, conducted by the UN civilian police （CIVPOL） 
contingent, had begun in early 2000.39 In order to overcome shortcomings 
in indigenous personnel, UN administrators recruited over 350 Eastern 
Timorese former officers of the Indonesian National Police （POLRI） who 
were given four weeks transitional training. They also commenced a three-
month basic training of the first class of new police cadets in Dili in March 
2000, and all PNTL cadets underwent six months of field training in which 
they were supposed to receive on-the-job training from CIVPOLs in the 
relevant district or sub-district police station. By independence in 2002, 
over 1,700 PNTL officers had passed through the Police Academy, rising 
to approximately 3,000 by the end of the first phase of UNMISET in May 
2004.40 According to Hood, however, the UN’s recruitment of cadets for 
the PNTL “was marred by inadequate consultation with the East Timorese 
on the force’s composition, excessive reliance on former employees of the 
Indonesian police forces in East Timor, and the use of unsatisfactory ‘western’ 
［i.e. Euro-American］ procedures for determining candidates’ suitability”.41
 At the same time, Edward Rees has blamed the absence of the 
statutory security forces that can deal with the challenges they faced upon 
independence, and indeed, even the generation of these challenges, squarely 
upon the UN and the role it played in the “metamorphosis of the 24-year-
old East Timorese anti-Indonesian resistance movement （both the guerrillas 
and urban activists） into a professional defence force and police service”.42 
The plan for what would become the F-FDTL （FALINTIL-Forças Defesa 
de Timor-Leste or Defence Forces of East Timor） was based on a study 
commissioned by UNTAET to King’s College, London which offered 
three force configuration options: ［1］ a relatively large and heavily armed 
military of 3,000-5,000 personnel （preferred by FALINTIL）; ［2］ a force of 
1,500 regulars and 1,500 conscripts; ［3］ a force of 1,500 regulars and 1,500 
volunteer reservists.43 UNTAET chose the third, with UNSC Resolution 
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1338 enshrining the decision in January 2001, and urging the international 
community to provide financial and technical assistance and “encouraging” 
UNTAET to play the coordinating role.44
 In particular, Rees points to what happened when the UN 
administration did finally address the central problem when on February 1, 
2001, FALINTIL was retired and the force which was to become F-FDTL 
was established. 650 former FALINTIL were absorbed, but more than 
1,300 former FALINTIL guerrillas were excluded shocking many who 
had understood that simply by being FALINTIL that they would become 
F-FDTL. “It is important to note that the UNTAET-shepherded process 
whereby it was decided who would join the first F-FDTL battalion and who 
would be demobilized... - was the key turning point in the development 
of East Timor’s security sector. And the key mistake”.45 The actions and 
inactions of the early UN administrations in East Timor had, therefore, 
resulted in a poorly-trained and supervised police-force with little political 
legitimacy and tainted with the inclusion of recruits of senior officers from 
the former cadre of POLRI, a large number of former FALINTIL guerrillas 
as well as those who fought on the clandestine front left out in the cold, 
and a military at odds with the central administration and resentful of the 
UN. The politicization of, and divisions between the police and the military 
were exacerbated by the fact that the PNTL consisted primarily of Kaladis, 
people from the western provinces of East Timor, and the first battalion of 
the F-FDTL was consisted of former FALINTIL members who were mostly 
Firakus, people from the eastern provinces.46
（2）Post-2006 Crisis
 The 2006 crisis highlighted the inadequate development of state 
institutions for East Timor following the withdrawal of international security 
agents in the post-transition period. In fact, the fragility of the situation in 
East Timor and the necessity of the UN mission to continue its support for 
the state-building endeavors were identified by UN officials on the ground on 
the eve of the 2006 crisis. Ironically, it was during deliberations at the UNSC 
on the UN footprint in East Timor that the 2006 crisis erupted. The Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General, Sukehiro Hasegawa, who was the 
head of the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste （UNOTIL）, was in New 
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York to convince the UNSC to extend the mandate of UNOTIL, but the 
major donors felt that it was time for the UN to terminate its presence, i.e. 
the international legitimacy of the UN mission in East Timor had expired.47 
Despite the timely warnings and suggestions from cautious UN officials on 
the ground as well as some commentators, the international actors and the 
East Timorese authorities both failed to address the internal dimension of 
the security threat posed by rivalries among political groups.48 The report of 
the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, which was 
formed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights at the 
request of the Secretary-General, found the fragility of state institutions and 
the weakness of the rule of law to be underlying factors that contributed to 
the crisis.49 In response, UNSC Resolution 1704 approved the establishment 
of a multidimensional, integrated mission （UNMIT）. This time the official 
mandate specifically included “enhancing a culture of democratic governance”.
 Despite the ongoing instability, multiple successful elections were 
held in 2007. Ramos-Horta won the presidential polls on May 9 as an 
independent, against the FRETILIN candidate, Francisco ‘Lu-Olo’ Guterres. 
Then, on June 30,50 parliamentary elections brought former President 
Xanana Gusmão to power, this time as prime minister, as a result of post-
election maneuvers. The 2007 elections did not provide an overall victory for 
Gusmão’s CNRT （Congresso Nacional da Reconstrução Timorense or National 
Congress for Timorese Reconstruction）. Actually, CNRT only gained 18 
seats out of 65 seats in the parliament, while FRETILIN won 21 seats, which 
forced CNRT to form an alliance with other political parties in Parliament. 
According to Matthew Arnold, the significance of the 2007 elections was that 
FRETILIN, which had ruled with a strong parliamentary majority for five 
years, surrendered the government.51 In fact, according to the constitution, 
the leading party should form a government, if necessary, forming alliance 
with other political parties. Given that FRETILN won 21 seats （29 per cent 
of votes） and Gusmão’s CNRT 18 seats （24 per cent of votes）, FRETILIN 
was the leading party and therefore CNRT was not in the position to form 
an alliance to create a majority. Hence, from its inauguration the Gusmão 
administration was based on contested legitimacy.
 With such fragile legitimacy, the Gusmão administration faced the 
2008 alleged assassination attempt by a rebel group made up of former 
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“Petitioners” （army deserters or those illegitimately sacked by the 
authorities in the 2006 crisis, depending on one’s perspective）. Gastão 
Salsinha, a leader of the Petitioner/rebel group, never accepted that there were 
plans for the assassination of the president and prime minister, much less 
a coup.52 Indeed, much of the evidence for the conspiracy appears sourced 
with the administration and the media, and we may never know the truth. 
Thus the entire murky episode reveals competing claims of legitimacy and 
illegitimacy. But Damien Kingsbury also sees the events as having broken 
a critical stalemate in East Timor’s political life. For him, the death of the 
rebel group leader, former Major Alfredo Reinado, allowed the government 
to begin its program of relocating IDPs back to their homes free from the 
fear of insecurity generated by political instability and civil unrest caused by 
a movement by the Petitioners; it undermined the bargaining position of 
lawless forces; it distanced both the prime minister and the president from the 
taint of association with Reinado which had dogged them until that point; 
and it enhanced their legitimacy, particularly that of Ramos-Horta who was 
in a very real sense “blooded”.53
 For Matthew Arnold, that the incidents of February 2008 did not 
devolve violently out of control as happened in April and May 2006 is the 
best sign that East Timor was in fact stabilizing, and it is “notable that after 
the cantonment of the Petitioners in February 2008 and the surrender of the 
mutineers in April, the political tensions surrounding them calmed, and there 
has been no further violence directly related to them”.54 The government 
was mostly able to complete the relocation of IDPs and closing down their 
camps, paying families up to US$4,000 to return to their places of origin, 
equivalent of around eight years’ average income, and represented a significant 
incentive to most of the IDPs. Likewise, without Reinado’s shadow over 
the proceedings, there was eventually progress in resolving the claims of the 
Petitioners, even if not through returning them to the military, but with their 
acceptance of what appeared to be a generous pay-out offer of US$8,000 each 
to rebuild their lives.55 Thus by the end of 2008 East Timor was showing 
real signs of internal stabilization, reflected in the Australian Defence Force 
drawing down 100 of its 700 personnel contribution to the ISF sent to quell 
the troubles of 2006.56
 From 2009 to 2012 and the end of the UN missions, the national 
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institutions of East Timor assumed control with increasing confidence. 
Policing operations were gradually handed over to the PNTL, until with the 
final drawdown of UN and ISF, only some limited external logistical and 
training support has been required. As a result, and in the aftermath of the 
2006 crisis, Petitioners （newly recruited soldiers under UNTAET against 
the wishes and expectations of FALINTIL） have been effectively eliminated 
from F-FDTL, and F-FDTL has successfully been brought under the formal 
control of Xanana Gusmão. Furthermore, by placing F-FDTL and PNTL 
under the auspice of the Ministry of Defence and Security, and acting as 
the Minister of Defence and Security, Gusmão succeeded in extending his 
influence over both statutory security forces. Both the F-FDTL and PNTL 
officially remained politically neutral during the recent election campaigns. 
The elections in both 2007 and 2012, however, had allowed Gusmão to form 
a government, and thus, it was not necessary for him to mobilize the statutory 
security forces illegally. It remains uncertain whether F-FDTL and PNTL 
now owe their allegiance to the democratically elected government, regardless 
of the party or parties which emerge victorious in elections. 
（3）Perceived Legitimacy on the Ground
 In a relatively short period of time since regaining independence, East 
Timor has actually developed a comparatively good record of democratic 
competition and has firmly established many of the conditions for a working 
representative democracy. Indeed, in 2012, the year in which only the tenth 
anniversary of new-founded independence was celebrated, East Timor 
was able to hold three sets of free and fair elections （two presidential and 
one parliamentary） without significant disruption beyond stone-throwing 
incidents, appearing to consign its recent fractious and violent past to the 
pages of history, and allowing the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers to proceed 
as scheduled that December.57 Credit should be given to FRETILIN for 
playing the role of healthy “loyal” opposition party, after its defeat in the 2012 
elections forced them to realize that they no longer enjoy the nation-wide 
support of the people （FRETILIN got less then 30 per cent of votes）.
 The trajectory of East Timor’s security sector governance indicates 
that the UN missions in East Timor were able to navigate and support 
the indigenous leadership to carry out their state-building, in particular 
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bringing a certain level of stability on the ground.58 It would seem that by 
2012, UN missions in East Timor and their indigenous counterparts had at 
least overcome the majority of the shortcomings of the earlier peacekeeping 
missions in terms of providing national stability and physical peace and 
security. At the same time, however, a closer analysis of the SSR in East 
Timor reveals that the UN missions in East Timor were often at odds with 
their indigenous counterparts. Evidence shows that the incumbent leadership 
had began to circumvent, and, since the second electoral victory in 2012, 
marginalize UNMIT, as its presence was increasingly seen as irrelevant 
to security in East Timor, even to the point that Gusmão criticized the 
UN for “trampling on East Timorese sovereignty”.59 For example, overall 
security tasks were undertaken by Australian-led ISF and Portugal’s GNR 
（Guarda Nacional Republicana or the National Republican Guard）, not 
UNMIT. Furthermore, despite the fact that the UN suspended the policing 
responsibility of the government of East Timor and authorized UNMIT to 
undertake interim executive policing,60 UNMIT was ineffective in resolving 
the problem of the rebel group that was allegedly said to have attacked the 
president and prime minister in February 2008.
 Reflecting upon the lessons of the 2006 crisis in which F-FDTL and 
PNTL confronted each other, the East Timorese government merged the 
Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior and created the Ministry of 
Defence and Security under which both F-FDTL and PNTL were placed, 
which left both statutory security forces under the supervision of Gusmão 
（acting as the Minister of Defence and Security as well as the Prime 
Minister）. This move was against the policy of the UNMIT, which drew a 
clear line between the military and the police and advocated for functional 
separation of these statutory security forces.61 After the 2008 attack of 
the rebel group, the Council of Ministers established a joint command of 
F-FDTL and PNTL, and these statutory security forces conducted a joint 
operation to find Gastão Salsinha and his group, who fled in the mountains,62 
despite the fact that PNTL was technically under the command of UNMIT, 
and policing responsibility of the government of East Timor was suspended 
by UNSC Resolution 1704 in 2006.
 One of the mandates of UNMIT was to assist the government in 
conducting a comprehensive review of the future role and needs of the 
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security sector. This mandate was given to UNMIT in 2006, but the review 
report, “Securing the Future”, came out only in 2011, 5 years after UNMIT 
started its activities. Considering that UNMIT withdrew from East Timor in 
December 2012, it would not be wrong to say that the actual SSR assisted by 
UNMIT was not based on results of the comprehensive review of the security 
sector.63 That is to say, only when the UN assistance toward SSR was coming 
to a close, and the withdrawal of UNMIT was in sight, did the East Timorese 
government agree to the publication of “Securing the Future” created through 
UN assistance. 
 Under the “Supplement Arrangement,” UNMIT was also legally 
authorized to screen PNTL officers and certify those who meet the standards 
set by the UNMIT. This arrangement was formed not at the request of the 
government of East Timor, but UNSC Resolution 1704, which also raises 
legitimacy issues. The government of East Timor kept demanding the return 
of policing responsibilities from the UN,64 as the “Supplement Arrangement” 
stipulated that it was the Police Commissioner of UNMIT that was given 
an authority to decide when policing responsibility should be returned 
to the government of East Timor. In fact, the government of East Timor 
circumvented this “Supplement Arrangement” and conducted autonomous 
policing operations on several occasions without the endorsement of the 
UNMIT. For example, in addition to the joint operation with F-FDTL 
mentioned above, the government of East Timor organized another joint 
operation in the western districts of Bobonaro and Covalima for several 
months.65 Furthermore, PNTL formed a “Dili Task Force” to address the 
problems of youth gangs and martial arts groups in Dili two years before 
policing responsibility was formally returned to the government of East 
Timor.
 In short, despite the nominal positive outlook, the credibility of 
UNMIT as a security provider and interim law enforcer in East Timor in 
the eyes of the indigenous leadership had started decaying as early as 2008. 
The government of East Timor did not perceive the ongoing hosting of 
UN missions to be to its advantage, and thus did not extend its consent to 
continuing intrusion of its sovereignty by UNMIT. The UN is well aware of 
this challenge of eroding legitimacy:
101
Waseda Global Forum No. 12, 2015, 81－107
  Experience has shown that the perceived legitimacy of a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation’s presence may erode over time, if the size of 
the United Nations “footprint” and the behavior of its staff becomes 
a source of local resentment; or if the peacekeeping operation is not 
sufficiently responsive as the situation stabilizes. Peacekeeping missions 
must always be aware of and respect national sovereignty. As legitimate 
and capable government structures emerge, the role of the international 
actors may well need to diminish quickly. They should seek to promote 
national and local ownership, be aware of emerging local capacities, and 
be sensitive to the effect that the behavior and conduct of the mission 
has upon the local population.66
 12 years of UN involvement may be seen as having brought East Timor 
an interim stability. Yet the initial mistakes by UNTAET in security sector 
governance caused serious damage not only to the human security of the 
people of East Timor, but also to the credibility and legitimacy of the UN 
as an interim administrator. During the UNMIT period, the UN sought to 
make up for its lost credibility. Its involvement in bringing national stability 
remained ineffective, however, due to eroded legitimacy in the eyes of local 
authorities and population. 
 The UN missions in East Timor had set themselves much more 
ambitious targets than the provision of short-term national stability and 
physical peace and security, in line with much broader definitions of SSR, 
encompassing as they did, reference to sustainable development and the 
equitable development of civil and social services. These broader targets in 
this case were established in part because of the normative principles of equity, 
fairness, and human rights, upon which foundations the UN rests, and the 
new state of East Timor being constructed by the UN in its image. A more 
pragmatic reason was, however, an awareness that unjust social and economic 
settlements and distribution could cause discontent which could then spill 
over into the security realm. According to the UN Public Administration 
Programme （UN PAP）, governance and violent conflict are intimately related 
with most occurrences of the latter being “caused and sparked off” by failures in 
the former, while there is also a reverse causality with conflicts pulling down 
governance and public administration institutions and structures. The process 
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of reconstruction is not only long and highly expensive, but also requires 
careful analysis of the causes of the conflict, and the nature of the governance 
and public administration that should be put in place to avoid its recurrence.67 
Ⅴ．Conclusion
 This paper examined the issues of legality and legitimacy of the UN 
missions, which undertook a major state-building endeavor in East Timor. 
In doing so, given that East Timor is seen by many as something as a test 
case, or even benchmark for a new form of peacekeeping, it has demonstrated 
some important lessons for the formulation of future legal and normative 
constraints, as well as implementation strategies. While UNSC Resolutions 
and references to Chapter VII enforcement and executive mandates will 
surely satisfy the legal foundation of such UN operations, at the same time, if 
UN peacekeepers fail to maintain a healthy relationship with local authorities 
and they neglect to nurture and respect local leadership and ownership, UN 
legitimacy on the ground will soon be jeopardized. The current mandates of 
UN PKOs have been expanded, but their strategy and operational priorities 
still remain those of traditional ones, i.e., they are geared towards achieving 
short-term peace and physical security. The legitimacy of UN operations will 
be consolidated if human security imperatives are also addressed by the UN 
presence on the ground, planning for sustainable peace and development after 
the withdrawal of the UN.
 Xanana Gusmão claimed that the UN intervention must bear some 
of the blame for the events of 2006 as it did not do an adequate job in 
preparing East Timor for independence, lacked respect for local culture, and 
the conspicuous consumption of the UN bureaucracy was an affront to the 
mass poverty surrounding them.68 Mericio Akara, founder of Luta Hamutuk, 
concurs, asking where the money went, while noting that if the US$9 billion 
emergency aid from 2000-2002 had been spent in accordance with good 
governance and planning, the ongoing problems would be nowhere near 
as severe. The main problem he argues is that it was spent on consumption 
rather than investment.69 While West Timor’s budget of US$400 million 
stretches to cover 4 million citizens, in East Timor US$1.3 billion is spent 
on 1.1 million citizens. Francisco M. de Vasconcelos blames the discrepancy 
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on too many international advisors.70 Exclusionary practices and the lack of 
capacity-building increased reliance on outsiders and led to local wariness 
about imposed and unreliable systems while “new institutions have not tended 
to provide human security or protection”.71 Meanwhile, Erik Paul notes that, 
“while Australia spent more than A$2 billion on its military intervention, 
what was needed was an equivalent Marshall plan to put the country on 
its feet”.72 Ines Martins of La’o Hamutuk likewise criticizes international 
organizations for paying attention to physical security when the biggest 
problems faced in East Timor were the other societal sectors such as colonial 
legacies, the need for justice, accountability of perpetrators, rural poverty and 
land rights.73
 These accusations are not groundless, nor were they a surprise to the 
United Nations. Furthermore, it is now conventional wisdom that local 
ownership is essential for successful peacebuilding, but still the UN practice 
on the ground continues to exclude local stakeholders in the design of UN 
operations as it was the case in East Timor. The very fact that UN missions 
are carrying out a human security mandate such as SSR is regarded as a 
serious infringement upon state sovereignty by a host nation; therefore, the 
UN legitimacy on the ground can easily be eroded if it is not handled with 
care. It can be argued that state-building assistance by the series of UN 
missions in East Timor was regarded as usurpation of sovereignty, and that 
as human security challenges were left unresolved, long-term prospects for 
peace and development remain uncertain, and the legitimacy of UN missions 
open to question, if not their legality. The UN needs to excel in midwifery, 
and should master strategic planning to assist local stakeholders in addressing 
human security challenges. This is not only the most relevant normative 
justification for UN involvement in post-conflict peacebuilding, but also it is 
a practical way to overcome the problem of fragile legitimacy in international 
state-building assistance.
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